Statement for Presentation by

Paul Steckle, M.P.

Huron-Bruce

March 21st, 2005

To the House of Commons During Debate

on Bill C-38 (Same-Sex Marriage)

Mr. Speaker:

I am pleased to be able to speak to this matter today.

I would like to underscore, from the outset, that I will not digress into name calling nor will I offer condemnation of others who may not share my views on this topic.

I firmly believe that we should debate ideas in this Chamber and that it is both acceptable and expected that people of good faith will from time-to-time have legitimate differences of opinion.

Accordingly, to help succinctly outline my thoughts on this contentious and complex issue, I will endeavour to subdivide my remarks into two categories.

1. My personal thoughts;

2. The Supreme Court Ruling;

Firstly, let me take a moment to share my personal thoughts.

I strongly believe that the institution of "marriage" should remain confined to opposite sex couples.

I strongly support the stand that federal lawyers took in the Ontario Court when they said that marriage embodies the complementary of the two human sexes – it is not simply a shopping list of functional attributes, but a unique, opposite-sex bond that is common across different times, cultures and religions as a virtually universal norm. Marriage is a relationship that is as old as time itself. It existed prior to our laws and is a core building block of modern society that must be preserved.

All-in-all, retention of the traditional definition of marriage is not about discrimination against same-sex partners. After all, same-sex couples already have all the tax and societal benefits extended to opposite-sex couples.

Let’s for a moment examine the recent ruling of the Supreme Court on the subject. While this particular aspect is complex, I would like to attempt to offer clarity with respect to what the Court said and didn’t say.

Essentially there are two points that should raise concern; the impact that re-definition of marriage could have on religious officials and institutions and the impact that it could have on non-religious officials who perform civil marriages and issue marriage licenses.

Thirdly, the Court did not answer the question whether the opposite sex requirement for marriage is consistent with the Charter.

The Supreme Court did not say that to maintain the traditional definition of marriage would be unconstitutional. I t said that to change the definition would be within the power of the federal government. There is a distinct difference.

Now, to break down the concerns surrounding each of these important points.

ISSUE #1: Protection of religious officials and institutions from being forced to perform same-sex marriages.

For many opposed to changing the definition of marriage to include same sex marriages, the major point of contention is the impact this decision could have on religious institutions and officials.

The federal government has, most recently through the statements of the Prime Minister, stated that, the guarantee of religious freedom in Section 2(a) of the Charter is broad enough to protect religious officials from being compelled to perform civil or religious same-sex marriages that violate their religious beliefs.

The clarity with which these assurances have been given was echoed in material circulated by the Liberal Party. Specifically, on December 11 th, 2004, in a document received by my office, the Liberal Party stated that the Supreme Court decision upheld the guarantee of religious freedom in section 2(a) of the Charter. It further stated that the said protection is broad enough to prevent religious officials from being compelled by the state to perform civil or religious same-sex marriages that are contrary to their religious beliefs.

What the document omitted was the statement included in the Supreme Court’s decision which said that religious freedoms would be protected unless there were unique circumstances with respect to which the would not speculate.

At the same time the government, again through the Prime Minister, has been stating that the consequences of enshrining same-sex marriage will not impact religious institutions or religious officials.

While the Court has been emphatic with respect to the generally held right under the Charter which will ensure that religious officials cannot be compelled by the state to perform marriage ceremonies against their faith and that the same applies to the use of “sacred” places, there remains an open question related to “unique circumstances.”

Also, we have no absolute definition of what constitutes “sacred” places.

I would like to know if that would include a reference to all church or ministry held properties – some of which are made accessible to the general public?

This question comes to mind because, even as I speak now, the Knights of Columbus in BC are being forced to defend themselves against charges of discrimination.

The Knights of Columbus recently refused to permit a gay couple to use their facility for a same-sex wedding and, as a result, they have been called to account for their actions by the BC Human Rights Tribunal. It seems that their religious beliefs may not be enough to protect them against a charge of discrimination based upon the sexual orientation of their rejected clients.

ISSUE #2: Of the individuals duly empowered by the civic authority or provincial governments, to perform marriages, would they be able to avail themselves of the Charter protection of their religious beliefs?

The Court in its opinion has indicated that under certain circumstances there would appear to be limits on religious freedom. In its ruling the Court clearly indicates that where a collision of rights occurs that collision must be approached on the contextual facts of actual conflicts. The Court went on to state that where the rights cannot be reconciled a true conflict of rights is made out. In such cases the court will find a limit on religious freedom and go on to balance the interests at stake under Section 1 of the Charter.

The application of this limit was said to apply principally to individuals who are not religious officials but are empowered to perform marriages yet refuse on the grounds of religious freedom.

In essence, the Court is saying that it would override the personal religious freedoms of citizens if they came into conflict with other more fundamental rights. In such circumstances, the Court felt that it would be improper to assess whether the proposed act, if adopted, would create a collision of rights in otherwise undefined spheres.

Again there is recognition of as yet unanswered questions which may arise in the future.

The Charter states the following with respect to religious freedom:

2. “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(a) freedom of conscience and religion”

The operative word is “everyone”

In response, the Attorney General said that the interest engaged and protected by Section 2(a) of the Charter is freedom to hold one’s religious beliefs. This freedom has been characterized by this Court as the absence of coercion or constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have chose, he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be truly free.

He went on to explain that freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one can be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs.

To me, it would appear this reference would possibly include marriage commissioners and other civil servants expected to perform marriage ceremonies who express opposition on religious grounds to doing so.

Even certain Ministers and Members of this House have said that this will be the case.

ISSUE #3: What does it mean if the Court has not answered the fourth question related to whether opposite sex marriages are consistent with the Charter?

As to the need to answer the question the Court explained that the government’s stated position that it will proceed with legislative enactment regardless of what answer we give to this question. The Court felt that the government had clearly accepted the rulings of lower courts and had adopted their position as its own. Justices believed that, given the government’s stated commitment, an opinion on the constitutionality of an opposite sex requirement for marriage serves no legal purpose.

Again, what this means is that the Supreme Court did not rule on whether or not the traditional definition of marriage is unconstitutional because, by not appealing the lower court decisions on the matter, the government had already indicated that it intended to make same-sex marriage legal.

At a minimum the points that I have referred to have given rise to more questions. I believe that, in the absence of clarification from either the courts or the Department of Justice, we as legislators must step to the plate and make certain that no stone is left unturned.

If the points raised have any substance, there is no blanket protection for religious institutions or officials.

If the points raised are accurate, there certainly will be no protection provided to civil officials who are currently empowered to perform marriages who attempt to use the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Charter.

Until these points are given further clarity, or there is an adequate explanation as to why the concerns outlined above are without merit, it would be impossible for me to support the proposed legislation as I now understand it.

Let me be crystal clear. I support the Charter but, while I believe the Charter is a fine document with lofty ideals, I do not accept that it is being interpreted by the courts in a manner consistent with its intended premise.

On the matter of rights, I should also point out that there is not an authority in the world, including the United Nations or the Supreme Court of Canada, that has declared the right to marry to be a basic right or has suggested that maintaining the opposite sex only definition of marriage is discriminatory.

I point this out only to show that this is not a matter of discrimination but rather a public policy debate that has been selected for advancement.

In closing, I am not prepared to vote in favour of same-sex marriage for the reasons I have set upon the table today. Moreover, when I survey each household in Huron-Bruce with the questions “should same-sex marriage be legalized,” a resounding 83% told me no.

As the representative of the people and as a man of faith, I see no alternative.